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Many laws address deception. Familiar examples include: 
the torts of deceit, libel and defamation; the crime of theft by 
false pretenses and federal mail and wire fraud statutes; the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, the Lanham Act, and state 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices laws; laws prohibiting 
securities fraud and requiring issuer disclosures; the contract 
defense of misrepresentation; and the law of perjury. Less 
familiar examples include the Organic Food Production Act of 
1990, which prohibits misleading uses of “organic” on food 
labels;1 the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, which provides for civil 
and criminal penalties against those who pass off goods as 
Indian products;2 section 340 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, which provides for the 
denaturalization of individuals whose citizenship was procured 
 
* Agnes N. Williams Research Professor, Professor of Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center. I am grateful for feedback from participants at the Rothgerber 
Constitutional Law Conference at the University of Colorado School of Law in 
April 2017, as well as comments from Ann Lipton and Justin Marceau. The paper 
also benefited greatly from my participation in the Deception Roundtable 
organized by Woodrow Hartzog and Mark McKenna and sponsored by the 
University of Notre Dame Law School in May 2016. 
 1. Organic Foods Production Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–24 (1990). 
 2. 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (2010). 
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by concealment of a material fact or willful misrepresentation;3 
and section 508 of the Communications Act of 1934, which 
makes it a federal crime to rig a game show.4 
Although these laws are rarely studied or taught together, 
they collectively constitute a coherent body. The law of 
deception, as I use the term, comprises laws that regulate the 
flow of information to prevent or remedy dishonesty, 
disinformation, artifice, cover-up, and other forms of trickery, 
as well as wrongfully caused mistakes, misunderstandings, 
miscalculations, and other types of false belief.5 On that 
definition, the law of deception includes more than laws 
addressing lies and other misrepresentations. Falsehoods are 
but one way that a person can cause a false belief in another. 
Thus false advertising law recognizes that a literally truthful 
advertisement can cause consumers to draw false inferences; 
tort law recognizes that concealing a fact can be as wrongful as 
lying about it; and disclosure duties recognize that the failure 
to act can also cause false beliefs in others. The law of 
deception includes these and other laws that target deceptive 
acts and omissions. 
This Essay argues that legal scholars and jurists would do 
well to think about the law of deception as a whole.6 My claim 
is not that the law of deception is one single thing. I doubt that 
there is a master principle or purpose that runs through all 
laws that target deceptive behavior.7 But one finds a 
constellation of design problems and theoretical questions 
 
 3. 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1952). But see Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 
1918, 1930–31 (2017) (resolving an interpretive question and holding that false 
statements must directly lead to naturalization to be a basis for conviction). 
 4. 47 U.S.C. § 509 (1934). 
 5. Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 
GEO. L.J. 449, 449–50 (2012). 
 6. For two important recent works in the area, see EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, 
FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM TO MADOFF 179 (2017) and SEANA 
VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY AND THE LAW 
(2014). 
 7. The same might be said of other areas of law commonly treated as unified 
wholes. The law of contracts covers everything from informal transactions 
between family members to employment agreements to highly negotiated long-
term supply agreements between multinational corporations. There is little 
reason to think that the social interest in enforcement is the same across such 
different transactions. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE 
THEORY OF CONTRACTS (2017). And yet one learns something by thinking about 
the law of contract as a whole—even if part of the lesson is about differences 
within the category. 
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reappearing throughout the category. A syncretic approach 
illuminates characteristic challenges lawmakers face when 
designing laws of deception, the range of design solutions to 
them, and the social and political interests that legal 
regulation of deceptive behavior implicates. 
The bulk of this Essay, comprising Parts II and III, 
describes four clusters of issues that reappear across the law of 
deception. The first, which is the focus of Part II, concerns 
rules of interpretation. Before a fact finder can determine 
whether a statement is false, she must interpret what it 
means. Different laws of deception incorporate different rules 
of interpretation. Depending on the cause of action, legal 
liability might turn either on a statement’s literal meaning or 
on contextually determined implied meanings. And a few laws 
of deception also impose legal default representations. 
Although scholars have written volumes about the legal 
interpretation of constitutions, statutes, contracts and other 
types of legal speech acts, we still lack a complete 
understanding of how interpretation works in the law of 
deception. Different laws of deception employ different 
approaches to interpretation. It is worth thinking 
systematically about how and why. 
Part III describes several ways in which laws of deception 
reflect a commitment to both speaker and hearer autonomy.8 
Section III.A examines the sorts of harms laws of deception are 
designed to prevent or remedy. I distinguish four types: harms 
to those deceived; harms to persons about whom a falsehood is 
told; harms to honest market participants; and harms to the 
communicative environment (which might not be a legally 
cognizable harm). Understanding which harms a law of 
deception targets is essential to determining how it should be 
designed, as illustrated by some of the current confusion in the 
area of securities fraud. Identifying legally salient harms is 
also essential to determining an outer boundary for laws of 
deception, as shown by the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Alvarez.9 Alvarez’s application of the harm principle 
 
 8. I use “speaker” and “hearer” in this Essay as generic terms to refer 
respectively to someone who performs a communicative act and to someone who 
observes or receives that communication. Speakers in this technical and generic 
sense can communicate through speech, writing, gestures and even meaningful 
silences. 
 9. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
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affirms the importance of speaker autonomy. 
Section III.B examines the maxim that deception vitiates 
consent, which appears in various guises in tort law, contract 
law, the crime of rape, and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Here there is a theoretical puzzle: it is difficult to say whether 
tort cases invoking the maxim turn on the wrong of deception, 
on the mistake that the deception causes, or on some mixture 
of the two. There is also a practical problem: although there is 
widespread agreement that not all deception vitiates consent, it 
is not yet obvious where or how to draw the line. The recent 
decision in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert illustrates 
both the limits of current line-drawing strategies, and reasons 
the law might sometimes permit deceptive manipulation.10 
Section III.C is also about consent, but comes at it from the 
other side: Should the law empower parties to contract out of 
liability for deceptive acts? In other words: Should the law 
recognize consent to being deceived? Here I identify three 
salient factors: the purpose of the law of deception, the type of 
deceptive act or omission at issue, and whether there is a 
reliable test for when parties have agreed to contract out. The 
last factor reintroduces problems of interpretation. These 
factors generate different answers for different laws of 
deception. 
The Essay as a whole suggests that individual freedom 
figures into the law of deception in at least three ways. Legal 
prohibitions on deception and the rule that fraud vitiates 
consent are partly justified by the fact that deception interferes 
with the autonomy of the deceived. Constitutional limits on 
laws of deception derive in part from our polity’s commitment 
to speaker autonomy. And a commitment to individual 
autonomy further suggests that parties should sometimes have 
the power to contract out of laws of deception. 
This Essay’s approach is exploratory. I seek to identify 
some important questions about laws of deception, not to 
provide definitive answers to them. And these are not the only 
questions one might ask. It would also be interesting to say 
more about the various ways that reliance figures into different 
laws of deception, the variety of scienter requirements, how the 
law handles cases where it is difficult to verify whether a 
statement is true or false, special procedural protections such 
 
 10. No. 2:13-cv-00679-RJS-EJF, 2017 WL 2912423 (D. Utah, July 7, 2017). 
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as the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b) or anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against 
public participation) laws, differences between how the law 
treats deception between private parties and deception of and 
by the government, and of course remedies. That said, the 
issues I discuss suffice to make the case for thinking about the 
category as a whole. 
As noted above, the major part of this Essay’s analysis 
appears in Parts II and III. Before getting there, it is necessary 
to say a few words about the idea that there is a distinctive 
thing we might call the “law of deception.” This is the project of 
Part I, which defines the object of study and discusses some 
boundary issues. 
I. WHAT IS THE LAW OF DECEPTION? 
I will use “deception” to mean an act or omission that 
wrongfully causes a false belief in another.11 The law of 
deception comprises laws designed to prevent, punish, 
compensate for, or otherwise address deception. 
So defined, deception need not involve a lie, and not all lies 
count as deception. A lie is a false statement made with 
knowledge of the truth and with an intent to deceive.12 A 
negligent or innocent misrepresentation might be deceptive, 
though it is not a lie. So too is a wrongful failure to correct 
another’s false belief. Both constitute deception without lies. 
Alternatively, a lie might have no chance of being believed. 
Lies by small children are obvious examples, though there are 
others. Such lies do not count as deception as I am using the 
term. 
It is sometimes difficult to disentangle deceptive acts from 
deceptive omissions. A literally true statement, for example, 
can deceive if it fails to include all the relevant information. In 
a classic example, the seller of a piece of real estate might 
mislead a buyer by disclosing that two roads are planned 
nearby but not mentioning a third that will run through the 
 
 11. My definition is similar to Seana Shiffrin’s use of the term: “I propose . . . 
that the wrong of deception, when it is wrong, properly focuses on the violation of 
a duty to take due care not to cause another to form false beliefs based on one’s 
behavior, communication, or omission.” SHIFFRIN, supra note 6, at 22. 
 12. This definition is somewhat narrower than Shiffrin’s conception of lying. 
For Shiffrin, a liar need not intend that she be believed. Id. at 13. Shiffrin also 
discusses the difference between lies and deception. Id. at 19–21.  
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property.13 In volunteering the information about the two 
roads, the seller implicitly represents that she is sharing all the 
relevant information on the subject. Such “half-truths” deceive 
by saying too little rather than saying too much. Alternatively, 
if a statement that the speaker believed to be true turns out to 
be false, the speaker might have a duty to correct it.14 Thus if 
the seller of a mobile home park tells a buyer that the septic 
system is in good condition and then learns of problems before 
closing, the seller has a legal duty to share that information.15 
Again, the deception happens through a combination of act and 
omission. Finally, in some contexts, the law simply requires 
disclosure, no matter what else is said. If the seller of a 
residential home is aware of termite damage, she might have a 
duty to share that information with the buyer—regardless of 
what else she has said about the quality of the property.16 The 
above definition of “deception” includes both acts and omissions 
so as to capture these and related phenomena. 
Sometimes an act or omission causes a false belief, but we 
hesitate to call it “deception.” I keep an umbrella in my office. 
Suppose I use it to walk home in the rain Monday evening. 
Tuesday morning, I bring the umbrella back to the office, and 
my colleague Naomi sees me carrying it. Naomi knows that I 
pay close attention to the forecast and mistakenly infers that I 
have brought the umbrella because it is likely to rain. My act of 
carrying the umbrella has caused Naomi to adopt a false belief. 
But have I deceived her? 
“Deception” is a word like any other. If we want to use it to 
describe the relationship between my carrying the umbrella 
and Naomi’s false belief, we can do that. But the category of 
deceptive acts and omissions will then grow very large. Nor will 
it bear a natural relation to behavior that the law does or 
should target. I therefore use “deception” more narrowly to 
designate behavior that violates some duty—moral, legal or 
other. Causation alone is not enough. Deception is behavior 
that wrongfully causes a false belief in another. As I am using 
the term, I have not deceived Naomi by bringing the umbrella. 
 
 13. Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 178 N.E. 672, 674 (N.Y. 1931). 
 14. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 
1979). 
 15. Bergeron v. Dupont, 359 A.2d 627, 628 (N.H. 1976). 
 16. See, e.g., Piazzini v. Jessup, 314 P.2d 196, 198 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); 
Pywell v. Haldane, 186 A.2d 623, 623–24 (D.C. 1962); Smith v. Renaut, 564 A.2d 
188, 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
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I would deceive her if I carried the umbrella with the intent to 
fool her, or if I had a duty to prevent her from drawing the false 
inference. 
It is also important to distinguish deception from 
manipulation more generally—a boundary line that reveals 
something important about why the law regulates deceptive 
practices. I will follow the Oxford English Dictionary and say 
that to manipulate another person is “to manage, control, or 
influence [that person] in a subtle, devious, or underhand 
manner.”17 Intentional deception often seeks to manipulate 
others. People lie to get others to do what they want. But not 
all manipulation involves deception. Advertising and branding, 
for example, can alter consumer preferences without inducing 
in them any false beliefs. In blind taste tests people prefer the 
taste of Pepsi to Coke, but in non-blind tests they prefer the 
taste of Coke.18 It appears that Coca-Cola has succeeded 
through its advertising and branding campaigns in 
manipulating consumers’ tastes and preferences. It is not 
obvious, however, that in doing so Coca-Cola has caused 
consumers to hold any false beliefs. It is possible to manipulate 
without deceiving. 
The law sometimes targets nondeceptive manipulation. 
The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement prohibits cigarette 
manufacturers from using “any Cartoon in the advertising, 
promotion, packaging or labeling of Tobacco Products.”19 That 
rule does not target deception. It is unlikely that anyone ever 
mistook Joe Camel for a real smoking dromedary. The purpose 
is to prevent the manipulation of children’s preferences 
through the use of images they are likely to find attractive. 
Regulating private nondeceptive manipulation generates 
difficult line-drawing problems. It is not surprising that the 
above example involves children. We are disposed culturally 
and politically to trust adults to make decisions for themselves, 
even in the face of advertising and other attempts to affect 
their choices or alter their preferences. And we are often 
skeptical of state attempts to distinguish good preferences from 
 
 17. Manipulate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 18. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and 
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 513–14 (2008). 
 19. Master Settlement Agreement 19, 
http://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q9QP-VWSB] (§ III(b)). 
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bad. These cultural and political commitments to individual 
autonomy can make it difficult to distinguish acceptable forms 
of private nondeceptive persuasion from wrongful ones.20 
Consequently, although we might not like private, 
nondeceptive manipulation,21 we rarely attach legal 
consequences to it. 
Deceptive manipulation presents an easier case. First, 
intentional deception violates a familiar moral rule: Do not tell 
a lie. Although the law of deception, as I have defined it, 
captures more than lies, much of it can be justified by appeal to 
that rule.22 There is broad agreement that deceptive 
manipulation is simply wrong. Second, folk psychology 
suggests it is more difficult to guard against deception than 
against other forms of manipulation. In Gulliver’s Travels, 
Jonathan Swift famously depicts Lilliputian lawmakers’ 
reasoning as follows: 
They look upon fraud as a greater crime than theft, and 
therefore seldom fail to punish it with death; for they allege, 
that care and vigilance, with a very common understanding, 
may preserve a man’s goods from thieves, but honesty has 
no defense against superior cunning; and, since it is 
necessary that there should be a perpetual intercourse of 
buying and selling, and dealing upon credit, where fraud is 
permitted and connived at, or has no law to punish it, the 
honest dealer is always undone, and the knave gets the 
advantage.23 
 
 20. For an autonomy-based argument against regulating private 
manipulative speech, see David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom 
of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 362–65 (1991). For some thoughts on the 
related but different question of state attempts to manipulate the choices people 
make, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE 11–17 (2016). 
 21. Consider, for example, the recent controversy over Uber’s surreptitious 
use of “psychological inducements and other techniques unearthed by social 
science to influence when, where and how long drivers work.” Noam Scheiber, 
How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-drivers-
psychological-tricks.html [https://perma.cc/QZ3S-B2M6]. Thanks to Ann Lipton 
for suggesting the example. 
 22. Seana Shiffrin has, I think, done more than anyone else to tie various 
laws of deception back to the moral obligation not to lie. See generally SHIFFRIN, 
supra note 6. 
 23. JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS 48–49 (Arthur E. Case ed., The 
Ronald Press Company 1938) (1726). Sissela Bok, in her work on the ethics of 
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We are social creatures who cannot help but rely on 
information we receive from others to navigate the world 
around us. Deception thus strikes at the heart of the faculty of 
reason, and so it is especially difficult to guard against. Third, 
prohibiting deceptive behavior does not threaten the familiar 
picture of legal subjects as autonomous and self-sufficient 
agents. To respect autonomy is to allow individuals to 
sometimes make bad choices. But a choice based on 
misinformation is not fully autonomous, especially if the 
misinformation was provided by someone attempting to 
influence the recipient’s behavior. As David Strauss observes, 
“lies that are told for the purpose of influencing behavior . . . 
involve a denial of autonomy in the sense that they interfere 
with a person’s control over her own reasoning process.”24 
Deception therefore threatens hearer autonomy in a way other 
forms of manipulation do not. That fact is part of the 
justification for laws of deception. 
There exist large literatures discussing specific areas of 
the law of deception. Scholars have written extensively on false 
advertising law, securities law, the federal mail and wire fraud 
statutes, mandatory disclosure rules, and other laws of 
deception. Most of these studies restrict themselves to a single 
region of the law of deception. Parts II and III make the case 
for thinking about the law of deception as a whole. Together 
they identify four issues that reappear in multiple laws of 
deception: interpretation, harm, the effect of deception on 
consent, and consent to deception. These are not the only issues 
that cut across the category. And I will not attempt to provide a 
complete analysis of them. My aim is more modest: to convince 
the reader of the value of thinking across traditional doctrinal 
boundaries about the law of deception as a whole. Part II 
 
lying, makes a similar point: “Both [deceit and violence] can coerce people into 
acting against their will. . . . But deceit controls more subtly, for it works on belief 
as well as action.” SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
LIFE 18 (1978). 
 24. Strauss, supra note 20, at 354. Or again: 
The victim of a lie is denied that freedom. In making decisions, the 
victim is pursuing the liar’s ends, not the victim’s own. Lying creates a 
kind of mental slavery that is an offense against the victim’s humanity 
for many of the reasons that physical slavery is. While it is hard to argue 
that lying is worse than physical slavery, lying has a peculiarly offensive 
quality because it denies the victim even the knowledge that he or she is 
being used by another. 
Id. at 354–55. 
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discusses interpretation, Part III the other three issues, each of 
which touches in its own way on autonomy interests. 
II. INTERPRETATION 
Laws of deception are often interpretive in the sense that 
their application requires a fact finder to interpret what one or 
both parties said or did. This Part explains why this is so, 
identifies several varieties of interpretation one finds in laws of 
deception, and discusses the choice between them. 
A. The Role of Interpretation in Laws of Deception 
As I am using the term, an act or omission is deceptive 
only if it causes a false belief in another. There are many 
different types of causation, from the influence of one billiard 
ball on another to the forces of history. In the case of deception, 
causation often happens through communication. Thus a 
simple case of deception might have the following structure: 
A tells B proposition P; 
As a result, B acquires a belief that P; 
In fact P is not the case. 
Not every form of deception fits this model. It does not 
capture, for example, all cases of wrongful nondisclosure. But it 
describes the basic communicative structure of many deceptive 
acts. 
Communication requires interpretation. A hearer 
understands what a speaker says by interpreting the meaning 
of the speaker’s words, acts or omissions. We might therefore 
unpack the simple case as follows: 
A utters sentence S to B; 
B interprets S to mean that P; 
As a result, B acquires a belief that P; 
In fact P is not the case. 
Sometimes to determine that a speaker’s utterance of a 
sentence S means P, it is enough to understand S’s literal 
meaning. If Naomi asks me, “Is the forecast for rain?” and I 
reply, “No,” there appears little reason to read our exchange as 
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saying anything other than the words’ literal meaning. In other 
situations, people use words to say something other than or in 
addition to their literal meanings. Obvious examples include 
metaphor, irony and understatement. Implied meanings can 
also supplement literal ones. If Naomi asks me, “Is the forecast 
for rain?” and I reply, “No,” we almost certainly both 
understand that we are talking about the local forecast in the 
District of Columbia. If it later rains and I make the excuse 
that I was speaking of the forecast for Flagstaff, Arizona, 
Naomi might rightly complain that I spoke deceptively. 
Implicit in our conversation, and my answer, was that we were 
talking about the D.C. forecast. 
All this might seem obvious. But it highlights the role 
interpretation often plays in deception. Many laws of deception, 
in turn, ask decision makers to interpret potentially deceptive 
acts, with the aim of anticipating or reproducing the 
understanding of a possibly deceived hearer. To succeed in an 
action for the tort of deceit, for example, a plaintiff must show 
that the defendant made “a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, 
intention or law.”25 Proof of misrepresentation typically 
requires demonstrating three separate facts: 
1. D uttered S in circumstances y;26 
2. D’s uttering S in circumstances y meant P; and 
3. P was not the case. 
The first and third inquiries are factual ones. Establishing 
the second requires that the fact finder interpret the 
defendant’s words, actions or omissions.27 This second inquiry 
puts the tort of deceit in the broader category of interpretive 
laws—laws whose application requires acts of interpretation. 
B. Varieties of Interpretation in the Law of Deception 
To say that a law’s application involves interpretation is 
not yet to say what sort of interpretation. Rules of 
 
 25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 26. To keep things simple, the example assumes deception by false statement. 
One might complicate things by replacing “uttered S” by “uttered S, committed 
meaningful act A, or failed to O.” 
 27. In earlier work I have called the second step the “representation inquiry,” 
and the third step the “veracity inquiry.” IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, 
INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT 19–21 (2005). 
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constitutional interpretation and construction differ from those 
governing statutes, which differ from those that apply to 
administrative regulations. One finds even more heterogeneity 
in the private law. There is a marked difference, for example, 
between the interpretive rules that apply to contractual 
agreements and those that apply to the tort of deceit.28 There is 
also variety—and this is the central point of this Part—within 
the law of deception. 
Let us begin with the tort of deceit. When one looks in the 
case law for rules of interpretation, at most one finds generic 
statements such as: 
The truth or falsity of representations for purposes of a 
fraud claim is judged in the light of the meaning which the 
plaintiffs would reasonably attach to them in existing 
circumstances and the words employed must be considered 
against the background and in the context in which they 
were used.29 
As the passage suggests, the tort of deceit incorporates our 
everyday, nonlegal, context-sensitive interpretive practices. 
The meaning that matters is the meaning a reasonable person 
would attribute the words in the circumstances. This explains 
why the seller who tells the buyer of two planned roads might 
commit deceit if she does not mention a third.30 Even if the 
statement is literally true, an ordinary hearer is likely to 
understand it to imply that the speaker has disclosed all the 
relevant information on the subject—that there is not a third 
planned road. 
This is not to say that the common law of deceit leaves fact 
finders at sea when determining the meaning of what a 
defendant said or did. The cases contain many judicial 
observations on what constitutes puffery or sales talk, about 
when a statement of opinion may be actionable, about how 
half-truths can mislead, and on other interpretive questions. In 
the end, however, the interpretive rule is one of 
reasonableness: How in the circumstances should the 
 
 28. Klass, supra note 5, at 455–56. 
 29. Renaissance Leasing, LLC v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 322 S.W.3d 112, 133 (Mo. 
2010) (quoting Haberstick v. Gordon A. Gundaker Real Estate Co., 921 S.W.2d 
104, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)). 
 30. See supra p.5 (“road” hypothetical). 
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defendant have expected the plaintiff to understand the 
defendant’s words, acts and omissions? Common law actions for 
deceit turn on the everyday, contextually determined 
understandings of what was said. 
Other laws of deception employ different rules of 
interpretation. When applying the federal perjury statute, for 
example, all that matters is the literal meaning of the witness’s 
words. In Bronston v. United States, the Supreme Court 
considered the following colloquy with the defendant in a 
bankruptcy proceeding: 
Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. 
Bronston? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Have you ever? 
A. The company had an account there for about six months, 
in Zurich.31 
Although it was true that the company had used a Swiss 
bank account, the defendant also had opened a personal one. 
Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit 
had upheld the defendant’s conviction for perjury based on the 
jury’s finding that his nonresponsive answer was calculated to 
deceive. “For the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1621, an answer 
containing half of the truth which also constitutes a lie by 
negative implication, when the answer is intentionally given in 
place of the responsive answer called for by a proper question, 
is perjury.”32 That outcome is consistent with the context-
sensitive interpretive approach courts adopt in tort cases.33 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed. In reviewing the 
exchange, the Court allowed that “in casual conversation [the 
interpretation that the defendant had no personal account] 
might reasonably be drawn.”34 But despite the natural 
understanding of the defendant’s answer, its tendency to 
mislead, and a jury finding of intent to deceive, the Court held 
 
 31. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 354 (1973). 
 32. United States v. Bronston, 453 F.2d 555, 559 (2d Cir. 1971), rev’d, 409 
U.S. 352 (1973). 
 33. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“A 
representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker knows or 
believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state additional or 
qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation.”). 
 34. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 357. 
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that its literal truth was a complete defense. 
[T]he perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the 
statute invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in 
derailing the questioner—so long as the witness speaks the 
literal truth. The burden is on the questioner to pin the 
witness down to the specific object of the questioner’s 
inquiry.35 
Federal perjury prosecutions turn on the literal meaning of 
the defendant’s words, largely excluding contextually 
determined implied meanings. 
Although the interpretive rules that attach to the federal 
perjury statute and to the tort of deceit differ from one another, 
both look to the nonlegal meaning of what the defendant said—
whether it is the meaning that can be found in a dictionary 
(perjury) or in the full context of the statement (deceit). A few 
laws of deception apply default legal representations, either 
instead of or in addition to their other meanings. A legal 
default is a meaning that attaches to an act not by virtue of 
everyday understandings or conventional meanings, but by 
virtue of a legal rule. 
The tort of promissory fraud, for example, rests on the rule 
that “a promise necessarily carries with it the implied assertion 
of an intention to perform.”36 Although based on conversational 
norms, this is a legal default. The law automatically imputes to 
every contractual promise the representation of an intent to 
perform, unless the promisor says otherwise. Federal securities 
law provides another example. In its 2015 decision in Omnicare 
Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension 
Fund, the Supreme Court held that when an issuer makes a 
 
 35. Id. at 361. 
 36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1979). See 
also, e.g., Chedick v. Nash, 151 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“It is equally 
plain that every party to a contract necessarily represents that it intends to 
perform all its obligations, whether implicit or explicit.”); Old S. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Woodall, 326 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala. 1976) (“When a promise is made the promisor 
expressly or by necessary implication states that he then has a present intention 
to perform.”); Cicone v. URS Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 887, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(“[A] promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform.”); 
Berkeley Bank for Coops. v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980) (“The promise 
itself is regarded as a representation of a present intention to perform.”) (quoting 
1 FOWLER VINCENT HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 571–72 
(1956)). 
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statement of belief in a registration statement, a reasonable 
investor “expects not just that the issuer believes the opinion 
(however irrationally), but that it fairly aligns with the 
information in the issuer’s possession at the time.”37 The Court 
thereby attached to an issuer’s statement of belief a default 
legal representation that the issuer has a reasonable basis for 
that belief.38 A third example can be found in judicial 
applications of the federal False Claims Act (FCA). Under the 
implied certification doctrine adopted by several circuits, a 
government contractor’s request for payment implicitly 
represents, as a matter of law, that the contractor is not in 
material breach.39 Again, the law attaches a default implied 
representation. 
In all these examples, the default corresponds to ordinary 
practices. We do not generally expect a person to promise 
without intending to perform, to have an opinion without a 
reasonable basis for it, or to ask for a contract payment without 
having performed. These legal rules, however, establish 
noninterpretive defaults. A fact finder does not need to 
interpret a promise to determine whether it represented an 
intent to perform. The law tells her it does. Interpretation 
comes in only if the defendant argues that the promise had a 
non-default meaning. 
These three types of rules—contextual conversational 
interpretation, literal meaning interpretation, and default 
representations—do not exhaust the ways laws of deception 
seek out meaning. In false advertising and securities cases, for 
example, courts have developed more complex interpretive 
regimes involving a mix of these and other approaches. But the 
simple examples are enough to show some of the variety among 
the interpretive rules one finds in laws of deception. 
 
 37. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 
S. Ct. 1318, 1329 (2015). 
 38. See Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, 
Legal Risk Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 772 (2016). 
 39. See, e.g., Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) (overturned by 
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016)); Ab-Tech 
Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994). For a detailed account 
of the implied certification doctrine, see Michael Holt & Gregory Klass, Implied 
Certification under the False Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1 (2011). 
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C. Choosing an Interpretive Rule 
That variety suggests several interesting questions. Most 
obviously, why do laws of deception adopt the interpretative 
approaches they do? Or to turn it around, what does the 
interpretive approach of any given law of deception tell us 
about that law? The answer might involve any of at least three 
factors: the communicative environment, behavioral incentives, 
and the law’s ability to affect how people speak. 
First, the communicative environment is often salient. One 
might argue, for example (though the Bronston opinion did 
not), that the rules of ordinary conversation do not apply on the 
witness stand. Conversation presupposes a degree of 
cooperation that is often absent from testimonial exchanges. 
Thus in the examination of a hostile witness, it might be 
unreasonable to interpret a nonresponsive answer in light of 
the question asked, and better to focus on the answer’s literal 
meaning. The ordinary rules of conversational implicature do 
not apply in this context. 
Advertising is another example of a specialized 
communicative environment. Because advertisements do not 
involve a back-and-forth between the consumer and advertiser, 
they do not allow for clarifications, qualifications or follow-ups 
one finds in conversation. And though the relationship is not 
adversarial in the way the examination of a hostile witness can 
be, consumers are generally aware that advertisers seek to 
influence their buying choices—that advertisers are not their 
friends. These factors help explain why courts applying the 
Lanham Act’s false advertising provisions sometimes eschew 
interpretation of anything but an advertisement’s literal 
meaning, and why when there are allegations of implicit 
misrepresentation, courts often require empirical evidence of 
consumer deception.40 
But the communicative environment is not the only 
explanation for choice of interpretive rules. A second factor is 
incentive effects. 
The Bronston opinion, for example, emphasizes not the 
adversarial context of testimonial examination, but the possible 
deterrent effect of liability for implicit misrepresentations. 
“[O]ne consideration of policy overshadowed all others during 
 
 40. See Klass, supra note 5, at 466–69, 488–94. 
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the years when perjury first emerged as a common-law offense: 
‘that the measures taken against the offense must not be so 
severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or 
testifying.’”41 Better, the court reasoned, to protect against 
testimonial deception ex ante through a lawyer’s assiduous 
examination at the time of the testimony than with ex post 
penalties for false implicit meanings. 
The incentives created by defaults are especially 
interesting. A legal default representation can be used not only 
to capture what most speakers mean most of the time, but also 
to create new incentives for good behavior. The FCA’s implied 
certification doctrine, for example, reinforces the maxim that 
“[m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the 
Government.”42 The FCA imposes treble damages and per se 
fines on contractors who misrepresent performance when they 
request payment from the government. The default 
representation of material compliance when seeking payment 
therefore gives contractors a new reason to ensure material 
compliance before requesting payment. The default addresses 
not only what contractors say, but also what they are expected 
to do. 
Along the same lines, consider the practical effect of the 
Omnicare rule that a stock issuer’s expression of belief in a 
registration statement implies a reasonable basis for that 
belief. Hilary Sales and Donald Langevoort have argued that 
the default incentivizes corporate directors to inquire into the 
existence and basis for such statements before signing off on a 
filing. The default thereby serves to reinforce and even extend 
directors’ fiduciary obligations to shareholders.43 Again, the 
default representation can affect underlying behavior by giving 
actors a new reason to ensure that it is true. 
Third, legal interpretive rules can be designed to affect not 
only how people behave, but also how they speak and how they 
understand one another. The literal-truth rule for perjury does 
more than insulate witnesses against prosecution. It gives the 
examiner a new reason to avoid ambiguity and to ensure that 
 
 41. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973) (quoting Study of 
Perjury, reprinted in Report of New York Law Revision Commission, Legis. Doc. 
No. 60, at 249 (1935)). 
 42. Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 
(1920). 
 43. Sale & Langevoort, supra note 38 at 790–95. 
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she receives a clear answer to her question. The rule of 
interpretation thereby shifts regulation away from ex post 
punishment and toward ex ante observation and correction. 
How much a legal rule influences how people communicate 
depends on the circumstances. In the contexts of government 
contracting, the sale of securities, and questioning of witnesses 
under oath, participants are likely to be highly attuned to their 
words’ legal effects. The tort of deceit, in distinction, covers 
contexts in which speakers and hearers are unlikely to be 
thinking about the relevant legal interpretive rule. We want 
and expect people in everyday commercial transactions to be 
able to rely on the ordinary, contextually determined meanings 
of their words. The tort of deceit therefore applies interpretive 
rules that mirror those of hearers, rather than trying to alter 
them. 
*  *  * 
Before leaving the topic, it is worth emphasizing that not 
all laws of deception require interpretation for their 
application. I have already mentioned disclosure obligations. 
When the buyer of a residential home claims that the seller 
failed to disclose termite damage, the preliminary question is 
not the meaning of what the seller said, but whether she said 
anything at all to put the buyer on notice of a termite problem. 
Nondisclosure is only one example of noninterpretive laws of 
deception. If the seller of a ship takes it out of dry dock and 
puts it in the water to hide its rotting hull, an action for 
concealment will turn not on the meaning of the ship owner’s 
words or actions, but on the reason for floating the ship.44 And 
even where words are used to deceive, a law might instruct 
decision makers to use noninterpretive tools to determine their 
effect. Thus, as noted above, the Lanham Act sometimes 
requires empirical studies of an ad’s effects on consumer 
beliefs, rather than utilizing a fact finder’s assessment of its 
best interpretation. Laws of deception not only employ various 
interpretive rules, but sometimes eschew or supplement 
interpretation. 
 
 44. See Schneider v. Heath, 170 Eng. Rep. 1462, 1462–63 (Ct. Com. Pls. 1813); 
Klass, supra note 5 at 460–65. 
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III. DECEPTION AND AUTONOMY 
I argued in Part I that laws of deception are justified in 
part by the fact that deception interferes with a hearer’s 
autonomy. This Part discusses three clusters of issues, each of 
which touches in its own way on our political culture’s 
commitment to individual autonomy: the harms that laws of 
deception address; when deception does and does not prevent 
legally effective consent; and parties’ ability to contract out of a 
law of deception. 
A. The Harms of Deception and Speaker Autonomy 
Another way of dividing up laws of deception (in addition 
to categorizing them by interpretive rules) is according to the 
harm a law addresses. As a starting place, consider the 
difference between deceit and defamation. The tort of deceit is 
designed to protect the recipient or hearer of a false statement 
from acting on false information. The plaintiff is a hearer and 
must prove both reliance and resulting injury.45 Defamation, in 
contrast, is designed to protect the subject of a falsehood. The 
plaintiff is not a hearer who was deceived, but the subject of 
the falsehood whose reputation was thereby harmed. The 
plaintiff must show not that she relied on the falsehood, but 
that others were likely to believe it to her detriment.46 
Alternatively or in addition, a law of deception might be 
designed to protect honest market participants from the 
competitive harms caused by dishonesty. A competitor’s 
deceptive business practices can harm honest businesses in two 
ways. The deceptive practices can draw customers away from 
those who do not engage in deception. And they can erode trust 
more generally, creating a market for lemons and driving down 
prices.47 Thus in the United States the earliest pushes for laws 
against false advertising came not from consumers or consumer 
protection groups, but from the business community. As 
historian Edward Balleisan explains, national businesses 
“create[d] a series of nonprofit business organizations between 
 
 45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 46. See 3 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 519 (2d ed. 2011). 
 47. When buyers cannot trust sellers’ statements of quality, they assume all 
goods are of low quality, and so are willing to pay only the price for low-quality 
goods. In such a “market for lemons,” it does not pay to sell high-quality goods.   
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the mid-1890s and early 1920s, all primarily dedicated to 
rooting out fraud in the American marketplace.”48 These 
organizations both engaged in private campaigns against false 
advertising and partnered with government enforcers. That 
history partly explains why contemporary false advertising law 
so heavily relies on competitor suits under the Lanham Act. 
Finally, a law of deception might not take aim at concrete 
harms, but instead seek to underwrite credible communication 
in one or another forum more generally or to punish specific 
types of lies. Consider 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which criminalizes 
knowingly and willfully “mak[ing] any materially false, 
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” to a 
government official.49 The statute does not require that the 
government official believe or act upon the false statement.50 
Suppose, for example, a criminal investigator asks a suspect 
about a crime that the investigator knows the suspect 
committed, and the suspect predictably denies having 
committed it. Lisa Kern Griffin has compared such exculpatory 
lies to puffery—a falsehood that no one would believe or rely 
on. “The natural reaction of most subjects confronted by 
investigators is to respond in a way that deflects scrutiny and 
forestalls liability—a reaction that agents generally 
anticipate.”51 Yet the lie can be prosecuted under section 1001. 
The absence of a reliance requirement suggests that the law 
seeks not to prevent the harms of deception, but to enforce a 
more general duty of truthfulness when dealing with 
government officials. “Although on its face the statute protects 
the accuracy of the information that individuals convey to the 
government, the desire for efficiency, the assertion of authority, 
and a preoccupation with apology better explain charging 
decisions.”52 
Together these examples indicate at least four broad 
functions that laws of deception might serve. A law of deception 
might be designed to protect those who might be deceived; to 
protect those about whom a deceptive statement is made; to 
 
 48. BALLEISEN, supra note 6, at 179. 
 49. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2017). 
 50. Thus in Brogan v. United States, the Supreme Court declined to limit the 
crime to “falsehoods that pervert governmental functions.” 522 U.S. 398, 402 
(1998). 
 51. Lisa Kern Griffith, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social 
Meaning, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1520 (2009). 
 52. Id. at 1533. 
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prevent honest market participants from unfair competition by 
dishonest ones; and to promote honesty or punish dishonesty in 
specific communicative contexts, whether or not the deception 
results in concrete harms. These purposes are not mutually 
exclusive. Contemporary false advertising and trademark laws, 
for example, aim both to protect consumers from being deceived 
and to protect honest business from unfair competition. And 
criminal fraud laws might aim both to prevent harms to 
victims and to exact retribution on wrongdoers. 
It is sometimes uncertain just what type of harm a law of 
deception is meant to address. The law governing private 10b-5 
actions for securities fraud is an example.53 On some accounts, 
the cause of action is designed to compensate the victims of 
securities fraud—those who, in reliance on the deceptive acts, 
bought high or sold low. Thus the 10b-5 plaintiff must show 
inter alia reliance, causation and materiality.54 On other 
accounts, the purpose of the 10b-5 action is not to compensate 
the plaintiffs, but to police the integrity of the market as a 
whole. On this model, plaintiffs function as private attorneys 
general, deterring companies from engaging in securities fraud. 
The award is not so much to compensate the plaintiff for her 
loss as to reward her, and her attorney, for bringing the 
enforcement action, and to incentivize others to do the same.55 
The difference between these accounts is important when 
it comes to thinking about the rules for class actions. Not every 
buyer or seller of stocks will have encountered or relied on the 
act or omission at issue in a securities fraud case. This can 
make it difficult to satisfy the commonality requirement for a 
class action.56 The Supreme Court addressed this worry in 
1988 in Basic v. Levinson by establishing a presumption that 
market participants buy or sell stock not in reliance on 
particular representations, but on the assumption that its price 
is not generally distorted by prohibited misrepresentations or 
 
 53. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-
Market Tort, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1755 (2013). 
 54. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). 
 55. Goldberg and Zipursky argue that neither of these accounts succeeds, and 
propose a third. According to them, private 10b-5 actions that employ the fraud-
on-the-market presumption aim to compensate plaintiffs for non-reliance-based 
harms that misrepresentations cause. The cause of action is therefore 
fundamentally different from the tort of deceit, and better understood by 
comparison to the torts of negligence causing loss and tortious interference with 
prospective advantage. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 53, at 1799–1803. 
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
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omissions.57 That presumption provides to the class shared 
forms of reliance and causation. 
Basic’s theory of fraud on the market has, in years since, 
generated a host of further questions.58 Most importantly: How 
and when do issuer misstatements or nondisclosures affect 
stock prices? And do investors really assume that they have 
perfect information when they buy and sell? As Don 
Langevoort has observed: “Fraud and manipulation are 
predictable enough that it would be foolish for anyone simply to 
assume that a stock price has integrity. In an efficient market, 
the inevitable risk of fraud is priced and investors are 
compensated for taking on the risk—the market is not 
assuming its absence.”59 
If the empirical basis for the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption is shaky, whether or not to keep it depends on the 
purpose of the 10b-5 action—whether it is meant to compensate 
investors for actual losses, or to incentivize private attorneys 
general to help ensure the integrity of the informational 
market. On the former model, questions about the price effects 
of disinformation and how market participants make buy and 
sell decisions are essential. If it turns out such questions are 
difficult to answer for any tractable class of plaintiffs, so much 
the worse for class actions. On the latter model, the design 
question shifts to the optimal level of enforcement. If the goal is 
to reward enterprising lawyers who act as private attorneys 
general, the question is not whether Basic’s fraud-on-the-
market presumption is true, but whether it provides the right 
reward structure. 
The above discussion required going fairly deep into the 
securities-fraud weeds, but the point is a simple one: form 
should follow function. The proper design of any law of 
deception depends on the type of harm or harms the law is 
meant to address. 
Harm is also relevant to constitutional issues, adding 
another dimension to the relation between laws of deception 
and individual autonomy. In United States v. Alvarez,60 the 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Stolen 
 
 57. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
 58. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud 
on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151. 
 59. Id. at 160 (footnote omitted). 
 60. 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
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Valor Act of 2005, which criminalized falsely claiming to have 
received a military decoration.61 In 2007, Xavier Alvarez falsely 
stated at a local water board meeting that he was a retired 
Marine and had been awarded the Congressional Medal of 
Honor.62 These statements were not made for the purpose of 
securing a material benefit and apparently harmed no one—if 
they were even believed. But because the lie concerned the 
Congressional Medal of Honor, Alvarez was prosecuted under 
the Stolen Valor Act, which provided for a punishment of up to 
a year in prison. 
The Supreme Court held that Alvarez’s prosecution, and 
the Stolen Valor Act as a whole, violated the First Amendment. 
Although the decision was not unanimous, each of the three 
opinions focused on the question of harm. Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the plurality, emphasized that the Court’s prior 
statements that falsehoods receive no First Amendment 
protection had all occurred in “cases discussing defamation, 
fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with 
false statements.”63 Justice Breyer, in concurrence, similarly 
observed that when a statute prohibiting falsehoods escapes 
First Amendment scrutiny, it is because “requirements of proof 
of injury, and the like, narrow the statute to a subset of lies 
where specific harm is more likely to occur.”64 Accordingly, 
both Kennedy and Breyer suggested that the Act might have 
complied with the First Amendment if it had required “a 
showing that the false statement caused specific harm or at 
least was material, or focus[ed] its coverage on lies most likely 
to be harmful or on contexts where such lies are most likely to 
cause harm.”65 Justice Alito, writing in dissent, did not dispute 
 
 61. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012), invalidated by United 
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 62. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 713–14. 
 63. Id. at 718. 
 64. Id. at 736 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
[M]any statutes and common-law doctrines make the utterance of 
certain kinds of false statements unlawful. Those prohibitions, however, 
tend to be narrower than the statute before us, in that they limit the 
scope of their application, sometimes by requiring proof of specific harm 
to identifiable victims; sometimes by specifying that the lies be made in 
contexts in which a tangible harm to others is especially likely to occur; 
and sometimes by limiting the prohibited lies to those that are 
particularly likely to produce harm. 
Id. at 734. 
 65. Id. at 738; see also id. at 723 (plurality opinion) (“Where false claims are 
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the major premise of the Kennedy and Breyer opinions—that 
constitutionality turned on harm. Instead Alito argued that lies 
about military honors in fact “inflict substantial harm,” 
sometimes tangible, as when they are used to secure material 
benefits, and more generally by debasing the award and 
undermining the credibility of truthful claims.66 In short, all 
three opinions in Alvarez agreed that prohibiting harmless lies 
violates the First Amendment. 
I observed at the end of Part I that in our political culture 
laws prohibiting deceptive manipulation are easier to justify 
than laws prohibiting nondeceptive manipulation because of 
the way deception interferes with hearer autonomy. Alvarez 
illustrates another boundary line: we are more comfortable 
prohibiting harmful deception than we are prohibiting 
harmless lies. That line corresponds to John Stuart Mill’s harm 
principle: “[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others.”67 The harm principle, in 
turn, is founded on a liberal commitment to personal 
autonomy, here speaker autonomy. Autonomy therefore figures 
into both the justification for laws of deception and the limits 
we put on those laws. Laws of deception are justified, at least 
in part, because deception undermines hearer autonomy. At 
the same time, our commitment to speaker autonomy leads us 
to generally limit those laws to cases of harmful deception, as 
distinguished from harmless lies. 
As the opinions in Alvarez illustrate, the line between 
harmful and harmless deception is not a bright one. And the 
judicial application of section 1001 suggests that sometimes we 
are comfortable punishing the harmless lie. The point is not 
that a commitment to speaker autonomy provides a fixed limit 
on laws of deception, but that it is an important consideration 
when evaluating them. 
 
made to effect a fraud, or secure moneys or other valuable consideration, say 
offers of employment, it is well established that the Government may restrict 
speech without affronting the First Amendment.”). 
 66. Id. at 742–43 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 67. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 
Publ’g Co. 1978) (1859). Mill himself, of course, deployed the harm principle in his 
defense of freedom of speech. 
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B. Deception and Consent 
The relationship between the law of deception and 
autonomy can also be seen in the effect of deception on what 
would otherwise be legally effective consent. 
It is commonly said that fraud vitiates consent,68 or in 
another formulation: “[C]onsent obtained on the basis of 
deception is no consent at all.”69 Such statements are often 
found in torts cases. For example, if B permits A to enter B’s 
home because A has misrepresented that she is a meter reader, 
A has committed trespass, even though B has apparently 
consented to the entry.70 If A induces B to agree to a touching 
by falsely representing that A is a physician, A has committed 
battery, despite B’s apparent consent to the touching.71 
Analogous rules can be found in contract law, Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and rape law. 
It is something of an open question how best to explain the 
rule that fraud vitiates consent. One could begin with the 
principle that no one shall benefit from her own wrong—nullus 
commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria.72 The wrong in 
these cases is the defendant’s deceptive conduct. The rule that 
fraud vitiates consent prevents the defendant from benefitting 
from that wrong. That result comports with our moral sense. 
And it disincentivizes engaging in the deception in the first 
place. 
There is, however, an alternative explanation. The rule in 
tort does not require misrepresentation by the defendant. It is 
enough, according to the Second Restatement of Torts, that 
“the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to 
consent by a substantial mistake . . . and the mistake is known 
to the other.”73 The mistake prong suggests another 
explanation: the rule that fraud vitiates consent is not so much 
about the wrong of deception as it is about the quality of the 
consent. When apparent consent to an invasive act is based on 
a substantial mistake, it is not truly voluntary and therefore 
not actual consent. If the invader is unaware of the mistake, 
 
 68. See, e.g., Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 20 (Wis. 1974). 
 69. McClellan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 247 A.2d 58, 61 (D.C. 1968). 
 70. State v. Donahue, 762 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
 71. See, e.g., Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of Am., 243 F.2d 331, 333 (3d Cir. 
1957). 
 72. Famously applied in Neiman v. Hurff, 993 A.2d 345, 347 (N.J. 1952). 
 73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 892B(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
KLASS_PAGEPROOFS_CLEAN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/20/2017  11:14 AM 
126 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
the appearance of consent provides something like a defense to 
the tort. That defense is not available, however, if the invader 
knows of the mistake. On this account, fraud vitiates consent 
not because the fraud is a wrong, but because one who 
fraudulently induces apparent consent knows that the consent 
is defective. 
Either account suffices to explain the rule. A third draws 
the two explanations together to provide an even stronger case 
for it, and returns us to an idea from Part I. When A obtains 
B’s consent through deception, it is not just that B’s consent is 
defective and A knows it. A has intentionally and 
surreptitiously caused B’s apparent consent. B has, in this 
respect, fallen under A’s control. B’s decision is not autonomous 
(self-governed) but heteronomous (governed by another). 
Consent obtained through deception is even less autonomous 
than consent based on other sorts of mistake. The consenting 
party is under the sway of the deceiver. 
It is not obvious that we need to decide between these 
three accounts of the rule that fraud vitiates consent. They 
may complement rather than compete with one another. There 
is, however, a more pressing practical problem: defining the 
rule’s proper limits. 
Richard Posner, writing for the court in Desnick v. 
American Broadcasting Company, has explained why the rule 
cannot possibly apply to all deceptive behavior. Without 
exceptions to it, 
a restaurant critic could not conceal his identity when he 
ordered a meal, or a browser pretend to be interested in 
merchandise that he could not afford to buy. Dinner guests 
would be trespassers if they were false friends who never 
would have been invited had the host known their true 
character, and a consumer who in an effort to bargain down 
an automobile dealer falsely claimed to be able to buy the 
same car elsewhere at a lower price would be a trespasser in 
the dealer’s showroom.74 
In all these cases the deception induces the consent. Had 
the consenting person known the truth, she would not have 
consented to the deceiver’s presence. Yet we hesitate to identify 
 
 74. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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them as instances of trespass—at least in the sense that they 
warrant legal intervention. 
The above examples might be dismissed as involving de 
minimis forms of deception. But courts have found exceptions 
to the rule even when the deception is more substantial. Two 
circuits have held that journalists do not commit trespass when 
they misrepresent who they are in order to gain access to a 
business.75 In the Fourth Amendment context, a drug suspect’s 
consent to a warrantless entry is effective even if induced by a 
police officer’s false claim that he is a customer seeking to 
purchase drugs,76 though if an officer misrepresents that he 
has a warrant the consent is not effective.77 And in most U.S. 
jurisdictions, the criminal law recognizes only two types of 
deception that negates consent to sex: a false representation 
that the sexual act is a medical procedure and impersonation of 
a spouse.78 Thus a man who misrepresents himself to be his 
twin brother to obtain his brother’s girlfriend’s consent to 
sexual intercourse might not commit sexual misconduct, even 
though the consent was clearly defective.79 
It is not obvious that there is a single line running through 
all these different rules. The exceptions to the rule that fraud 
vitiates consent are narrower in the Fourth Amendment and 
criminal law contexts than they are in tort law. And though 
deception can serve as a defense to contract80—fraud vitiates 
the deceived party’s agreement to the exchange—it is not 
obvious that there are any exceptions to the defense analogous 
to the exceptions in tort, Fourth Amendment law, or criminal 
law. 
With respect to trespass, Posner suggests that fraud 
vitiates consent only when the invasion infringes on interests 
that the law is designed to protect. Desnick v. American 
Broadcasting considered a news organization’s use of test 
patients with concealed cameras to investigate whether an 
ophthalmic clinic was performing unnecessary procedures. 
Posner explained that there was no trespass because “there 
 
 75. Id. at 1353; Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities / ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 518 
(4th Cir. 1999). 
 76. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
 77. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
 78. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of 
Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1397 (2013). 
 79. People v. Hough, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Dist. Ct. 1994). 
 80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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was no invasion . . . of any of the specific interests that the tort 
of trespass seeks to protect.”81 The test patients did not disrupt 
the clinic’s activities; there was no invasion of privacy; there 
was no eavesdropping or publicity of private facts; there was no 
theft of trade secrets or disruption of the peace. In short, “the 
entry was not invasive in the sense of infringing the kind of 
interest of the plaintiffs that the law of trespass protects; it 
was not an interference with the ownership or possession of 
land.”82 Consequently, the test patients’ fraud did not vitiate 
the clinic’s consent to their entry. 
There are problems with the line Posner suggests. For one 
thing, it presumes that courts can identify the types of 
interests that the law of trespass protects. Thinking about the 
question in the abstract, one might include on the list a 
property owner’s power to exclude from the property whomever 
she wishes. But such a list would be incompatible with the 
Desnick holding. The test patients’ deception denied the clinic 
the knowledge it needed to exercise its power to exclude. One 
might also wonder whether Posner’s analysis proves too much. 
If there is no invasion of interests that the law of trespass 
protects, perhaps consent—defective or not—should not make a 
difference. We should get the same result if the test patients 
had simply snuck into the clinic to film it. 
Finally, it is difficult to ignore that the Desnick defendant 
was a news organization trying to expose an eye clinic that was 
performing unnecessary surgeries. Most of Posner’s examples 
of non-vitiating deception involve socially accepted and even 
beneficial misrepresentations—a restaurant critic’s disguise, 
antidiscrimination testers’ misrepresented purpose, undercover 
reporting. Perhaps some of these cases turn as much on the 
social value of the deception as on the nature of the 
infringement. Where the deception is not a wrong, the law 
permits the deceiver to benefit from it. Or to put the point in 
the terms from above: the wrongdoing hearer in these cases 
does not have an autonomy interest that the law protects. The 
law in effect authorizes some forms of private deceptive 
manipulation.83 
 
 81. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 82. Id. at 1353. 
 83. Ian Ayres and I have made a similar point about why a lying promise to 
commit a crime should not be punished. See AYRES & KLASS, supra note 27, at 
158–61. 
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A recent District Court decision further illustrates the 
competing interests in these cases. Animal Legal Defense Fund 
v. Herbert84 (hereinafter “ALDF”) addressed the 
constitutionality of Utah’s ag-gag law, whose section 2(b) 
criminalized “obtain[ing] access to an agricultural operation 
under false pretenses.”85 The ag-gag law was designed to 
prevent undercover investigations, by the press and by animal 
rights advocates, of agricultural operations. The plaintiffs—
animal rights organizations and an individual who had been 
wrongly charged under the law—argued that it violated the 
First Amendment. 
ALDF is interesting in the context of this Essay because 
the court’s analysis of section 2(b) appears to pit the speaker’s 
autonomy interests against the hearer’s. The District Court 
began its analysis with Alvarez, reading the Supreme Court’s 
decision to entail that “if any of the lies prohibited by the Act 
do not cause legally cognizable harm, those lies are protected 
under the First Amendment and the lying provision of the Act 
criminalizing them is subject to scrutiny.”86 Among the possible 
harms that an investigator’s lies might cause is trespass: the 
investigator has gained access to the agricultural operation by 
misrepresenting who she is or what she intends to do when 
there. The District Court then based its analysis of the 
potential harm on Posner’s Desnick analysis: “[I]f the liar does 
not interfere with ownership or possession of the land, [the 
landowner’s] consent to access the property remains valid, 
notwithstanding that it was obtained nefariously through 
misrepresentation.”87 Because section 2(b) was written so as to 
criminalize merely gaining access to the property, the court 
concluded that it criminalized harmless lies—lies that, 
according to Alvarez, receive First Amendment protection.88 
From there it was a short step to concluding that the law was a 
form of content-based regulation, subjecting it to strict 
scrutiny, which the provision failed to pass.89 
There is a lot going on in ALDF. Here I make only three 
observations. First, because of ALDF’s procedural posture—the 
 
 84. No. 2:13-cv-00679-RJS, 2017 WL 2912423 (D. Utah, July 7, 2017). 
 85. Agricultural Operation Interference, Utah Code § 76-6-112(2)(b) (2017), 
invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2017 WL 2912423, at *15. 
 86. Herbert, 2017 WL 2912423, at *6. 
 87. Id. at *7 (footnote omitted). 
 88. Id. at *9. 
 89. Id. at *12–13, *14–15. 
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plaintiffs were animal rights activists bringing a facial 
challenge to the law—it was enough to find a possible 
application that would violate the First Amendment. As the 
court observed, the case “might seem to involve a weighing of 
the value of undercover investigations against the wisdom and 
reasoning behind laws suppressing them.”90 But “because of 
both the breadth of the Act and the narrow grounds on which 
the State defended it,” those issues were never fully litigated.91 
Second, this leaves open the question of whether a more 
narrowly tailored law—one, say, that criminalized not merely 
entering the land, but engaging in activities that the owner 
clearly objected to—would violate the First Amendment. Such 
a law would strain the boundaries of Posner’s approach. 
Whereas a common law court can invoke its own judgment as 
to what interests trespass does or does not protect, a narrowly 
drawn statute would answer the question for the court. Third, 
all this suggests that the First Amendment does not get at 
what is really worrisome about these laws. The real question is 
whether, where there is evidence that an agricultural producer 
is engaging in animal cruelty, the law should recognize its 
autonomy interest in being free from a deceptive intrusion. 
This, of course, is a policy question—one that the First 
Amendment might not answer. 
C. Consent to Deception 
One might also ask whether parties should be able to 
contract out of laws of deception—to legally consent to being 
deceived. For any given law of deception, we can ask whether it 
should be a default or a mandatory rule—whether parties 
should or should not be able to opt out of it. A commitment to 
freedom of contract generally means enforcing the terms 
parties choose. If, absent prior agreement, deception threatens 
hearer autonomy, the power to contract out of a law of 
deception would seem to expand party autonomy. 
Just when parties should be able to contract out of a law of 
deception depends on at least three factors: the law’s purpose, 
how wrongful the deceptive behavior is, and availability of 
effective mechanisms of consent. 
 
 90. Id. at *14. 
 91. Id. 
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The first factor is the law’s purpose, and especially the 
types of harms it is designed to address. It would be odd, for 
example, to allow participants in a judicial proceeding to 
contract out of the law of perjury. Perjury exists not to serve 
the individuals in a courtroom, but society’s interests in the 
integrity of judicial proceedings and accurate adjudicative 
outcomes. Giving participants the ability to contract out of 
liability for false testimony would not advance those purposes, 
but undermine them. 
The ability to opt out seems less problematic with respect 
to other laws of deception. Consider a multimillion-dollar 
corporate acquisition, in which the written agreement includes 
a list of carefully negotiated, legally binding representations. 
The parties to such a transaction, or their lawyers, might 
reasonably worry that statements made during the solicitation 
or negotiations might create a risk of tort liability or 
contractual defenses, thereby introducing uncertainty into a 
transaction and occasions for opportunism or judicial error. 
Here it appears more reasonable to empower the parties to 
limit their liability for at least some potentially deceptive acts. 
If the purpose of the rules is to protect the parties, why not 
allow sophisticated parties to agree to forgo their protections? 
But would we want such parties to be able to contract out 
of legal liability for any deceptive act? A second relevant factor 
is the nature of the deceptive act or omission. We might want, 
for example, to permit sophisticated parties to contract out of 
liability for negligent misrepresentations, but not for 
intentional ones. Such a rule would accord with the Second 
Restatement of Contracts, which states that parties can 
contract out of liability for negligence and adopt reasonable 
terms “exempting a party from the legal consequences of a 
misrepresentation,”92 but suggests that any “term exempting a 
party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or 
recklessly is unenforceable.”93 Thus, to return to the above 
example, we might want to empower parties to a corporate 
acquisition to limit liability for negligent misrepresentations 
made during the solicitation and negotiation periods, but not 
for intentional misrepresentations. Similarly, we might want to 
empower principals to contract out of tort liability for 
 
 92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 196 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 93. Id. § 195(1). 
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misrepresentations by their agents, including liability for 
fraudulent misrepresentations, but not for their own lies.94 
A third factor is whether there exists a reliable mechanism 
for determining when a party has agreed to no liability for 
deception.95 Consider, for example, false advertising law. 
Assuming arguendo that we wanted to allow consumers to opt 
out of its protections, perhaps in exchange for a lower price, it 
is not obvious how the opt-out would work. Would it be enough 
for an advertiser to print or say somewhere in the 
advertisement, “No legal guarantee of truthfulness”? Would all 
consumers pay attention to such legal language? Would all 
consumers understand it the same way? 
Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Act provides a nice example for thinking about the 
design problem. The Act provides that a consumer has the 
power to waive its protections, but only if “(1) the waiver is in 
writing and is signed by the consumer; (2) the consumer is not 
in a significantly disparate bargaining position; and (3) the 
consumer is represented by legal counsel in seeking or 
acquiring the goods or services.”96 The law further provides 
that the consumer’s counsel must be independent of the 
business and that the waiver must be 
(1) conspicuous and in bold-face type of at least 10 points in 
size; (2) identified by the heading “Waiver of Consumer 
Rights,” or words of similar meaning; and (3) in 
substantially the following form: “I waive my rights under 
the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 
Section 17.41 et seq., Business & Commerce Code, a law 
that gives consumers special rights and protections. After 
 
 94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 260 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). But 
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. c(4) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) 
(suggesting that such an exculpatory clause for an agent’s fraudulent 
misrepresentations is not effective when the principal knows or has reason to 
know that the agent is likely to misrepresent, but that notification that the agent 
does not have authority to bind the principal through certain representations 
could be). 
 95. In the parlance of contract theory, every default comes with an altering 
rule. An altering rule specifies who must say what and in what manner to realize 
a nondefault legal state of affairs. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An 
Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012). If parties can 
contract out of a law of deception, that law is a mere default. The question, then, 
is what the altering rule should be. 
 96. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42(a) (West 2017). 
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consultation with an attorney of my own selection, I 
voluntarily consent to this waiver.”97 
The reasons for all these requirements are fairly obvious: 
to ensure that the consumer’s waiver is informed and fully 
voluntary. So too are their costs in time, effort and attorney’s 
fees. One might guess that few if any consumers are likely to 
exercise their power to opt out of the Act’s protections. In 
practice, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Act is probably an all but mandatory rule. 
Effective and accurate mechanisms of consent are easier to 
imagine in bespoke transactions between legally sophisticated 
parties. Thus the Delaware Chancery Court has held that a 
simple exculpatory clause in a stock purchase agreement 
insulated the seller against any negligent 
misrepresentations.98 And sophisticated parties in securities 
markets regularly issue “big boy” letters to insulate themselves 
from liability for nondisclosure.99 The power to opt out of a law 
of deception requires an effective way to knowingly exercise 
that power. Whether to allow parties to legally consent to being 
deceived depends both on principle and on practicality. 
*  *  * 
Although this Part has emphasized the different ways that 
a commitment to individual autonomy figures into the law of 
deception, I do not want to make too much of the point. Laws of 
deception are about more than autonomy. They also serve inter 
alia to prevent financial and other harms, to establish and 
enforce morals of the marketplace, to compensate for wrongful 
losses, to punish wrongdoers, and to increase overall welfare. 
But our political culture’s commitment to autonomy figures 
into the outlines of the law of deception in distinctive and 
important ways. 
CONCLUSION 
The above tour through a few regions of the law of 
deception suggests something of its common geography. And I 
 
 97. Id. § 17.42(b)–(c). 
 98. ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisitions LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1035 
(Del. Ch. 2006). 
 99. See Edwin D. Eshmoili, Note, Big Boy Letters: Trading on Inside 
Information, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 133, 135 (2008). 
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hope it has convinced the reader of the advantage of thinking 
about the category as a whole. Although my goal has not been 
to advance any big theses about the law of deception, two broad 
areas of inquiry have emerged. The first concerns rules of 
interpretation. Although much work has been done on the 
interpretation of legal texts, very little has been done on how 
interpretation works in laws of deception. There is room for 
additional research in this area. The second is the complex 
relationship between laws of deception and individual 
autonomy. Because deception interferes with hearer autonomy, 
we are more comfortable regulating it than we are other forms 
of manipulation, and deception sometimes vitiates what would 
otherwise be legally effective consent. At the same time, a 
commitment to speaker autonomy limits the regulation of 
harmless lies. Finally, a commitment to autonomy suggests 
that parties should sometimes be able to opt out of protections 
that the law of deception otherwise provides. 
The above discussion does not cover all the questions one 
might ask about the law of deception. I have not systematically 
discussed materiality rules, knowledge and intent 
requirements, disclosure requirements or remedies. Nor have I 
addressed special procedural rules that attach to laws of 
deception, such as Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading or anti-
SLAPP laws. Also important are broader design questions, 
such as whether the law should rely on ex ante oversight or ex 
post punishment, or the relationship between legal and 
nonlegal norms. I hope it is enough to convince, however, the 
value to legal theorists of thinking about the law of deception 
as a whole. Thinking across the traditional doctrinal lines both 
suggests new answers to existing questions we might have 
about laws of deception and suggests new ones. 
 
